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A Comprehensive Assessment of




During the past ten years, evidence has mounted that drug and
alcohol abuse have critical workplace ramifications. The concern
about drugs in the workplace heightened as consumption rose in the
1980s. Employers began paying more attention to data suggesting
that their employees might be abusing drugs or alcohol, and that
such abuse had, among other things, serious safety and financial im-
plications for their businesses.
The 1988 survey results released by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse reflect the latest statistics on drug and alcohol abuse.'
The survey reported that marijuana, the most widely used illegal
drug, was consumed at least once a month by 11.6 million people,
and that more than thirty-three percent of Americans over twelve
years of age had tried marijuana at least once. It also reported that
cocaine was the second most consumed drug, with 2.9 million people
using it at least once a month, and 21 million people having tried it
at least once. In addition, the survey estimated that 1.9 million peo-
ple have tried heroin at least once, with regular users estimated at
500,000 to 750,000. The survey also concluded that 106 million peo-
ple consume alcohol at least once a month, with the number of al-
coholics estimated at about 17 million. Alcohol abuse is therefore
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1. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (1988).
America's number one substance abuse problem.
While these figures represent a sharp decline from 1985 esti-
mates,2 they still reflect illegal drug and alcohol usage by a substan-
tial part of the population and workforce. Although the numbers
from the 1988 survey indicate declines in occasional illegal drug use,
chronic cocaine abuse has risen sharply.3
The increased availability of data on substance abuse in the 1980s
led more employers to institute drug testing policies. Unions re-
sponded, contending that these policies violated, among other things,
employees' collective bargaining and constitutional rights. On these
bases, unions challenged newly implemented and revised drug poli-
cies in various administrative and judicial forums. This article looks
at the development of the law in this area vis-a-vis workplace reali-
ties. It will also explore the law's impact on the relationship between
employer and employee.
I. PUBLIC SECTOR CHALLENGES
In March 1989, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions on
drug testing in the workplace. Both cases involved testing in the pub-
lic sector. Several months later, the Court decided a third drug test-
ing case. This case dealt with testing in the private sector. The first,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,4 involved rail-
road workers; the second, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab,' involved Customs Service employees; and the third, Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,6
also involved railroad workers. None of these cases arose in "pure"
private sector settings. Nonetheless, their analyses and conclusions
will serve as guideposts for both private and public sector employers.
Long before Skinner and Von Raab reached the Supreme Court,
state and lower federal courts had ruled on the issue of drug testing.
2. A similar study done by the Department of Health and Human Services in 1985
reported that 18 million people used marijuana and 5.8 million used cocaine once a
month. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (1985).
3. The 1988 survey concluded that while there was a 37% overall decline in illegal
drug use, the number of people using cocaine once a week or more jumped from 647,000
in 1985 to 862,000 in 1988. First time estimates were also done for crack, which showed
approximately 484,000 people using the highly addictive form of cocaine at least once a
month, and 2,400,000 people have tried it at least once. See sources cited supra notes 1 -
2.
4. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
5. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
6. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
7. In each case, the employer was either covered by a collective bargaining con-
tract, regulated in some way, or fell under the guidelines of the Constitution or a federal
statute. Hence, these cases do not address an employer's right to test employees who have
been traditionally considered "at will."
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Public employers had implemented a variety of testing programs,
most of which were challenged in court. The resulting decisions es-
tablished a judicial sense of when employers had an acceptable basis
for testing. The following examples are illustrative of this principle.
A. Public Sector Testing Before Skinner
1. Random Testing
Many state governments implemented new policies which were
met with mixed success. Courts generally did not support state and
local government policies that called for random testing. For exam-
ple, in Capau v. City of Plainfield,8 a federal district court judge
stated that Plainfield, New Jersey violated the constitutional rights
of its firefighters and police employees when it conducted surprise,
random drug tests. The judge held that the city did not have reason-
able suspicion of drug use by any particular employee, and that the
workers were not given notice of the testing. In addition, the judge
ruled that the city's actions violated the fourth amendment prohibi-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge felt that
the applicable standard was one of reasonable, "individualized" sus-
picion of drug use."
Similarly, in McDonell v. Hunter,"0 a federal district court en-
joined Iowa's testing and search program which (1) allowed strip
searches of prison guards, (2) required them to provide blood and
urine samples, and (3) subjected their automobiles to searches at the
discretion of their supervisors. The court held that testing was appro-
priate under certain limited circumstances: for example, upon an
employee's application for a job, as part of a yearly physical, or
when reasonable suspicion exists."1
2. Prescheduled Testing
Unlike challenges to random testing, courts generally did not up-
hold employees' constitutional challenges to prescheduled drug test-
ing. In Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
8. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
9. Id. at 1522.
10. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
11. Id. at 1132. In modifying the decision, the appeals court found that random
urine tests "performed uniformly or by systematic random selection" were less intrusive
and, therefore, reasonable. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
Newark,"2 the court reviewed a policy which called for urine testing
twice a year of narcotics police officers. In approving the policy, the
court balanced the state's interest in the search against the officer's
expectation of privacy. The urine tests were viewed as minimal inva-
sions when balanced against the strong public interest in ensuring
that police officers are not drug users.1" The view was the same in
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman.4 Even though the Florida appellate
court enjoined random testing of police officers and firefighters in
this case, it recognized the legitimacy of testing during regularly
scheduled physical exams."
3. Transportation Entities
Courts are especially sensitive to policies implemented by public
transportation entities. In Sanders v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, 6 a federal appellate court upheld the right of the
transit authority to test its bus drivers and subway operators for
drugs and alcohol after an accident or mishap and after returning
from sick leave. In dismissing the claims of seventeen discharged em-
ployees, the court held that drug and alcohol use threatens public
safety, and that the discharges served the public interest.1 7
At issue in Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy 8
were the transit authority rules providing for blood and urine testing
whenever an employee is involved in a serious accident or is sus-
pected of intoxication. In upholding the rules, the Seventh Circuit
stated that in view of the paramount state interest in protecting pub-
lic safety by making sure its drivers are fit for duty, the drivers have
no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding submission to blood
and urine testing.' 9
4. Regulated Industries
A special interest is also taken in industries subject to government
regulation. For example, in Shoemaker v. Handel,20 the Third Cir-
cuit upheld a New Jersey law which allowed stewards to direct race-
track officials, jockeys, or horse trainers to submit to breathalyzers,
and which subjected jockeys to post-race urine testing. In disagree-
ing with the jockeys' contention that the rules violated their fourth,
12. 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987).
13. Id. at 473-74, 524 A.2d at 437.
14. 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
15. Id. at 1324-26.
16. 819 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 1156.
18. 538 F. 2d 1264 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
19. Id. at 1267.
20. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
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fifth, and ninth amendment rights, as well as the due process and
equal protection clauses, the court stated that the unique nature of
the horse racing profession provided the basis for such testing. The
court reasoned that the industry is highly regulated to prevent fraud,
and that drug testing serves to bolster the state's significant interest
in maintaining the integrity of all participants in the field.2 1
B. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
Skinner came to the federal courts much the same way as other
drug testing cases. In this instance, the Secretary of Transportation
implemented regulations providing for drug and alcohol testing of
certain railroad employees. The regulations required testing of cov-
ered employees after major train accidents or incidents, and upon
violation of certain safety rules. 2
The railway union sued to enjoin implementation of the testing
regulations, arguing that they violated the employees' fourth amend-
ment23 rights. The district court disagreed and granted summary
judgement upholding the regulations.2 4 The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that to qualify as reasonable under the fourth
amendment, testing must be based on a particularized suspicion that
21. Id. at 1143-44.
22. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408-09. The regulations at issue have their genesis in
Rule G, an industry-wide rule promulgated by the American Association of Railroads.
Rule G applies to all railroads, and was adopted in varying forms since its promulgation.
For the Secretary of Transportation's authority to promulgate safety rules, see 45 U.S.C.
§ 431(a) (1982). The pertinent regulation prohibiting the possession and use of alcohol
and controlled substances are codified at 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(1)-(2), (c) (1989). In
the railroad cases considered, we see essentially the same rule being subjected to public
and private sector analysis, with different results.
23. This amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The judicial creativity that has gone into interpreting this
amendment is noteworthy. Its application has moved from protecting against unreasona-
ble intrusions in homes by government officials, to numerous other situations created by
societal developments. Because the essence of the amendment is to protect what people
regard as private domain, it lends itself to great interpretive flexibility. See Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (principal object of fourth amendment is privacy, not
property). As a result, it is not surprising that drug testing policies which require the
giving of bodily fluids are construed as an infringment on privacy rights.
24. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1410. In a bench decision, the district court found that
the government and public's interest in railroad safety outweighed employees' interest in
the integrity of their bodies as protected under the fourth amendment.
drugs or alcohol were used.25 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, finding the testing regu-
lations reasonable under the fourth amendment.26
In reaching its decision, the Court had to jump several hurdles. In
the first instance, it had to determine the applicability of the fourth
amendment to the testing procedures (outlined by the regulations)
since the testing was conducted by private railroads. The Court
seemingly had little difficulty concluding there was "governmental
action"' -- a necessary predicate to fourth amendment application
and analysis. It found that railroads complying with one aspect of
the regulations did so by compulsion of the sovereign, and that the
government was not passive with respect to the remaining testing
provisions. 28 The Court concluded that the government had made
plain its strong preference for testing, and also its desire to share in
the fruits of such tests.29 The Court ruled that the regulations "pre-
empt[ed] state laws, rules, or regulations covering the same subject
matter, and are intended to supersede 'any provision of a collective
bargaining agreement, or arbitration award construing such an
agreement.' "30 It further noted that the regulations conferred spe-
cific rights on the Federal Railway Administration, thereby accentu-
ating the government's role.a3
Once past the government action hurdle, the Court tackled the
issue of whether the taking of blood and urine samples from employ-
ees constitutes a search and seizure within the ambit of the fourth
amendment. The Court relied on its own precedent to support its
position that blood tests constitute a search and seizure under the
fourth amendment. In this regard, it turned to Schmerber v. Califor-
nia,3' its first decision on the issue.
Schmerber, a 1966 ruling, dealt with a police officer's decision to
25. Id. at 1410. In reversing, the court of appeals acknowledged the significant
government interest in safety, but felt that the employees' privacy interests should be
better accommodated. It reached that accommodation by applying an individualized sus-
picion standard as opposed to the literal probable cause requirement of the fourth
amendment. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 583-88,
rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
26. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
27. Id. at 1411. The fourth amendment is inapplicable to private individuals. See
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984). In cases where an official of the
government is acting on the government's behalf, the amendment is triggered and there
is no difficulty with its applicability. The amendment can also be triggered by a private
party if the government plays a role in that private party's conduct. The degree of gov-
ernment involvement will determine whether the private party will be regarded as an
instrument of the government, and therefore covered by the amendment. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-89 (1971).
28. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411.
29. Id. at 1412.
30. Id. at 1411 (citations omitted) (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31,552 (1985)).
31. Id. at 1411-12.
32. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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have a blood sample taken from Schmerber, the driver of a motor
vehicle involved in an accident. The officer testified that when he
arrived at the scene of the accident, Schmerber's breath smelled of
alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot, watery, and glassy in appear-
ance. In addition, the officer stated that he noticed similar symptoms
of drunkenness at the hospital, where Schmerber was being treated
for injuries sustained in the accident. The officer then placed
Schmerber under arrest and directed a physician to take a blood
sample for alcohol testing, despite Schmerber's objection.3 3
At trial, Schmerber objected to the introduction into evidence of
the test results, on the basis that the circumstances of its "taking,"
and the admission of the chemical analysis into evidence, violated
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. He also con-
tended that such evidence violated his privilege against self incrimi-
nation, right to counsel, and his right not to be subjected to unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.3 4 The Court overruled the objection
and admitted the test results. 5
The Court ruled that taking of blood under these circumstances
constituted a search and seizure as contemplated by the fourth
amendment. However, the Court concluded that the search and
seizure was "reasonable" in this case. The Court held, "[s]uch test-
ing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend
antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning of that
Amendment. '36
The Court went on to elaborate on the policy and functional con-
siderations behind the fourth amendment. The Court noted that the
amendment's proper function is not to constrain all intrusions as
such, but rather to guard against intrusions which are not justified in
the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.
Among other things, the Court stated:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evi-
dence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact
33. Id. at 768-69.
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 767. The penetration of skin by needle for the purpose of obtaining
blood, arguably was not contemplated by the amendment. Even more attenuated are the
private medical facts that are revealed by the blood. However, the amendment's "right of
people to be secure in their persons" provision, lends itself to that interpretation. Al-
though Schmerber is not an employment testing case, it proved to be seminal in resolving
fourth amendment issues stemming from the taking of bodily fluids in the employment
context.
such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law
officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is
an immediate search.
•.. It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cher-
ished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does
not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under strin-
gently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substan-
tial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
37
Having established that blood tests are searches within the fourth
amendment, the Court turned to urine testing. Prior to Skinner, the
Court had not ruled on whether taking and testing of urine consti-
tutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. However, lower federal courts dealing with this issue so held.
For example, in Allen v. City of Marietta,38 the federal district court
squarely confronted this issue and held that a urinalysis is a search
and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
In this case, the city had concluded, based on several reports and
an undercover operation, that numerous employees in its electrical
distribution division were using drugs. Employees identified as drug
users were given the "alternatives" of resigning, taking a urinalysis,
or being fired. Six employees who elected to take the urinalysis
tested positive for marijuana. They were discharged. The employees
then sued, contending, among other things, that they were deprived
of their rights secured by the fourth amendment.
Ruling that the urinalysis was a search and seizure, the court
noted:
-While the court has some doubts whether requiring a person to provide a
sample of his urine for analysis is the kind of "search" contemplated by the
framers of the fourth amendment, the court feels constrained by current
law to hold that a urinalysis is a search within the meaning of that
amendment.39
Citing Schmerber, the court continued:
[T]he Supreme Court held that the extraction of a blood sample from a
defendant for purposes of determining his state of intoxication was a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. While the extraction of blood
from an unwilling defendant is qualitatively different from a requirement
that an individual provide the government samples of his biological waste
products, other courts have applied Schmerber to breathalyzer tests, ...
detention of persons suspected of smuggling contraband in their stomachs
until the contraband is expelled in a bowel movement .... [and] at least
two cases have treated urinalysis tests as searches within the meaning of the
fourth amendment.40
In upholding the interpretation of Schmerber previously given by
37. Id. at 769-72.
38. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
39. Id. at 488.
40. Id. at 488-89.
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lower federal courts, the Court in Skinner stated:
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of
blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, includ-
ing whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed
that the process of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some
cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself impli-
cates privacy interests.
Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, ...
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.,1
The Court went one step further and ruled that breathalyzer tests,
for which provision was made in the regulations, are also searches,
since they implicate "similar concerns about bodily integrity."4 As a
result, such testing also fell within the ambit of fourth amendment
analysis.
Hence, for the taking of blood, urine, and breath samples, the
Skinner Court concluded that an intrusion on privacy occurs at two
levels. In the case of blood, the first intrusion occurs when a needle is
used to penetrate beneath the skin to obtain the blood specimen; the
second intrusion occurs when that specimen is chemically analyzed
for physiological data. A similar analysis was applied for
breathalyzer tests. In the case of urine, the initial intrusion occurs
through the visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination. Like
blood, the second intrusion revolves around the private medical facts
that chemical analysis of the urine can reveal.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Skinner Court determined
that the fourth amendment applied because the promulgation and
use of the railroad regulations were "governmental actions." It then
noted that employees have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
their blood, urine, and breath specimens, and therefore, the taking of
such specimens constituted searches. As such, the existence of proba-
ble cause and its related fourth amendment considerations controlled
the determination of whether such searches conducted by employers
were reasonable.
In determining that testing employees was reasonable in Skinner,
the Court made the following findings: (1) Historically, American
railroads have suffered from the effects of alcohol abuse, and more
recently, from drug use by its employees; (2) substantial evidence of
harm exists in the form of accident investigation reports, which show
personal injuries, loss of lives, and extensive property damage argua-
41. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
42. Id. at 1412.
bly attributable to drug and alcohol use; (3) the employees affected
by the regulations at issue engaged in safety-sensitive work; (4) rail-
road employees have always been subjected to regulation because the
industry itself is regulated; and (5) government has always had a
strong interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling public and of
the employees themselves.43
Based on these findings, the Court determined that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in testing the covered employees. It
found that interest so compelling as to justify dispensing with the
traditional probable cause or individualized suspicion requirements
of the fourth amendment. However, the Court pointed out that its
decision was made in the context of."limited" intrusions on privacy
allowed by the Federal Railway Administration regulations. In this
regard, it noted that the circumstances that trigger testing and the
limits of such testing are narrowly defined, and that affected employ-
ees are on notice that testing can take place. The Court also noted
that the tests were standardized and there was limited discretion
given to those administering the testing program.44
In addition, the Court noted that because drugs and alcohol dissi-
pate from the bloodstream over time,45 the probable cause and war-
rant requirements would frustrate the objectives of the testing pro-
gram. Moreover, the Court felt that because it is burdensome to
force supervisors to comply with such intricate requirements, elimi-
nating the requirements assures the certainty and regularity afforded
by the regulations. 6
Similarly, the Court found the requirement of particularized sus-
picion impractical because generally employees seldom display signs
of impairment, and objective indicia of impairment are absent and
difficult to gather under the circumstances that trigger testing. It
also noted that individuals consent to significant restrictions on their
freedom when they accept employment, and that their privacy inter-
ests are reduced because they expect intrusions and restrictions inap-
propriate in other contexts. The Court felt that any additional intru-
sion caused by the testing procedures was minimal, and therefore,
did not infringe significant privacy interests.4
Based on its findings that neither probable cause nor particular-
43. Id. at 1407-08. These findings are critical to fourth amendment analysis since
the amendment only protects against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. A determi-
nation that the particular circumstances militate strongly in favor of testing will gener-
ally serve as the foundation for a finding of reasonableness.
44. Id. at 1415-16.
45. Id. at 1416. The speed with which drugs and alcohol pass from a person's
system remains a hotly litigated issue. The Court seems to have accepted the proposition
that medical technology can measure the speed of dissipation within reasonable limits.
46. Id. at 1416.
47. Id. at 1417.
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ized suspicion analysis was controlling, the Court went on to balance
the government's interest in testing against the employees' fourth
amendment interest in privacy. It found the government's interest in
safety, deterring drug use, and collecting information on the cause of
train accidents outweighed employees' privacy interests. The Court
further justified its conclusion by finding that employees already
have significantly reduced privacy expectations when they work in a
regulated industry. This factor, coupled with the employer's attempts
to minimize intrusion by performing the tests in a medical environ-
ment with nonemployer personnel, and by allowing unobserved urine
collection, served as additional rationale for the Court's holding."
C. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
Using the balancing analysis, the Court reached the same result in
Von Raab. 9 In this case, the United States Customs Service imple-
mented a drug testing program for employees seeking transfers or
promotions to positions which have direct involvement with drug in-
terdiction, or which require the employee to carry firearms or handle
classified information. The program required that affected employees
provide urine samples for analysis. ° The employees' union sued, al-
leging, inter alia, violation of fourth amendment rights. The district
court agreed with the union and enjoined the testing program." The
court of appeals vacated the injunction, holding that even though the
program effects a search as contemplated by the fourth amendment,
such searches were reasonable.5 2 The court reasoned that the Cus-
toms Service took steps to minimize the intrusiveness of the search
by (1) giving notice to affected employees of the impending test; (2)
not requiring visual observation of the act of urination; and (3) limit-
ing the discretion as to which employees must take the test. The
court also noted that testing was performed in the employment con-
text and emphasized the government's interest in assuring the integ-
rity of the service and safety of its employees. 3
48. Id. at 1418.
49. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-94.
50. Id. at 1387.
51. Id. at 1389. Unlike the district court in Skinner, this court found the employ-
ees' privacy rights weighed more heavily in the balance, and the testing plan was overly
intrusive, particularly because it was not based on probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion. Id. at 1389.
52. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1389.
53. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177-79
(5th Cir. 1987), afd in part and vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and upheld the
ruling of the court of appeals, except that portion dealing with em-
ployees who handle classified information.54 The Court remanded
this issue for clarification on what materials are classified and which
employees can be tested.55 The Court addressed the fourth amend-
ment concerns by invoking the same balancing analysis it employed
in Skinner. Reiterating its conclusion from Skinner that urine tests
are searches within the fourth amendment, the Court went on to as-
sess the reasonableness of these searches. Citing Skinner and other
precedents, the Court noted that "where a Fourth Amendment intru-
sion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion in the particular context. 5 6
In this case, the Court dispensed with traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements when it noted that testing was not per-
formed in a criminal context, but was a routine administrative func-
tion to prevent the development of hazardous conditions. The Court
noted that test results were not turned over to criminal authorities
unless the employee first gave written consent. 7 The Court went on
to find that warrants and neutral magistrates would severely impede
the daily operations of government offices, and are more suitable in
criminal cases.58
The Court then turned its attention to analyzing the Government's
interests in testing. The Court noted that affected Customs Service
employees had routine contact with contraband and drug traffickers,
and therefore, the government's interests in ensuring the integrity of
the Customs Service and the safety of its employees were compel-
ling. Although the testing program was not based on a history of
54. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
55. See id. at 1396-97. In an apparent attempt to keep the ruling limited to cir-
cumstances where there is a nexus between the government's interest in testing and the
content of an employee's job, the Court required a finding on the likelihood that the
categories of employees identified would gain access to sensitive information.
56. Id. at 1398.
57. Id. at 1389-90. Some drug testing policies require management personnel to
report incidents of violation to criminal authorities. In addition, discovered or confiscated
drugs are turned over to law enforcement officials who will pursue an independent line of
investigation in deciding whether to prosecute. Clearly, this occurrence heightens thejeopardy to the employee. Recognizing that the probable cause requirement is most com-
fortably applied to criminal cases, the Court likened the Customs Service's testing pro-
gram to administrative searches in which no notice or a standard less than probable
cause will suffice. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (searches of a
building to detect violations of building code reasonable since public's interest militates
in favor of such searches, and since it involves only limited invasion of citizen's privacy
interests).
58. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391.
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drug abuse or a belief that drug abuse was prevalent in the Service,
the Court found that "the Government has a compelling interest in
ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit and
have unimpeachable integrity and judgement." 59 The Court added
that since there is now a national drug crisis, Customs Service em-
ployees are often exposed to violence, have access to drugs, and are
easy targets for bribery. 0 These factors, combined with the public's
interest in interdiction, provided a sufficient rationale for finding a
compelling governmental interest.
Next, the Court assessed the employees' privacy or liberty inter-
ests. It premised its assessment on the proposition that one's freedom
in the workplace is more limited than in other contexts. Concomi-
tantly, it reasoned that employees have a diminished expectation of
privacy inasmuch as workplace realities make certain intrusions rea-
sonable, although such intrusions might be viewed as unreasonable
in other contexts.6 1 Analogizing Customs Service employees involved
in interdiction work or carrying firearms to United States Mint, mili-
tary, or intelligence employees, the Court justified further diminu-
tion of these employees' privacy interests.62 The Court concluded
that extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness through testing was
not unreasonable under the circumstances.
In balancing the Court's assessment of the Government's interests
against its assessment of employees' expectation of privacy, the Gov-
ernment's interests easily outweighed privacy rights. In view of the
substantial harm the Government sought to prevent, it was easy for
the Court to conclude that the Customs Service's urinalysis testing
program was a reasonable mechanism for deterring drug use and a
reasonable infringement on privacy interests.6 Privacy rights, there-
fore, were overwhelmed by public safety and national security
considerations.
D. What Do Drug Tests Prove?
What drug and alcohol tests seek to prove, in conjunction with
their reliability and accuracy, are hotly debated issues involving a
cross section of our society. Naturally, doctors and others with medi-
cal expertise are at the forefront of this debate. Those who oppose
59. Id. at 1393-94.
60. Id. at 1392-93.
61. Id. at 1393.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1395.
drug testing contend, among other things, that tests are indetermina-
tive as to when a drug was taken; that tests are unable to gauge
whether intoxication or impairment occurred as a result of the expo-
sure to a drug; and that tests cannot predict the extent of the effects
of a drug on health or behavior.
The Skinner court of appeals dealt with these issues, concluding
that blood and urine tests cannot measure drug intoxication or de-
gree of impairment, but rather, they only disclose drug metabolites
which may remain in the body for days or weeks after ingestion. 6
4
Therefore, the court's reasoning supports the argument that there is
an uncertain nexus between drug use and workplace misconduct or
mistake. Notwithstanding the negative criticisms, drug testing ap-
pears to have credibility. In Von Raab, the Court noted the reliance
by the Commissioner of Customs on data which concluded that test-
ing urine for drugs is technologically reliable, valid, and accurate.,,
The Customs Service program utilized the enzyme-multiplied immu-
noassay technique (EMIT) as an initial screening device. If the ini-
tial test was positive, a confirmation test was done using the gas
chromatography and mass spectrometry (GC-MS) method. Con-
firmed positive results were then reviewed by a licensed physician
who possessed the ability to evaluate these results.66
In Skinner, the employees tested had to provide both blood and
urine samples. The regulations provided that samples "be analyzed
by a method that is reliable within known tolerances."67 The Court
noted that these samples were analyzed using state-of-the-art equip-
ment and techniques. Primary reliance was placed on results from
blood specimens, which the Court accepted as providing clear indica-
tion of drug use and impairment effects.68
The Court apparently had no difficulty accepting the EMIT test
followed by a GC-MS confirmation as an accurate mechanism for
identifying drug use. Its pronouncement in Skinner on this issue evi-
dences its belief that technology is currently available to perform ac-
curate and reliable testing. The Court further elaborated that one
should not focus on conclusive proof of impairment, but rather on
the basic wrong or evil of drug ingestion. The Court noted that the
fruits of testing do not become irrelevant because they fail to conclu-
sively prove causation, but rather "the gravamen of the evil is per-
forming certain functions while concealing the substance in the
64. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 588-89 (9th Cir.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989).
65. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1387.
66. Id. at 1389.
67. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1410.
68. Id. at 1409.
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body
Employers with testing policies use a variety of methods to ana-
lyze blood and urine specimens."0 Positive test results usually lead to
employee discipline or discharge. The testing method an employer
chooses depends largely on how much the employer wants to spend,
and whether the employer is interested in testing for a wide range of
drugs or simply targeting a few illicit substances. 7 The more com-
monly used testing methods, along with some of the accuracy and
reliability issues they raise, are outlined below. 2
1. Thin Layer Chromatography (TLC)
This procedure involves applying blood or urine samples to the
bottom edge of specially prepared paper (chromatography paper)
which is then placed upright in a tank of solvent. The solvent is ab-
sorbed and ascends, carrying the contents of blood or urine. At the
appropriate time, the paper is removed from the solvent, dried, and
placed in a staining solution. Because different drugs travel up the
paper at different speeds, a drug is identified by its exact location on
the paper. The drugs interact further with the staining solution, serv-
ing as an additional identifying characteristic.
2. Radioimmunoassay (MIA)
This selective testing method uses antibodies and radioactivity to
determine the presence of drugs. The process involves combining a
urine specimen with a radioactive antibody. The solution is then
measured to determine whether its radioactivity has decreased. A
significant decrease in radioactivity indicates that a particular drug
is present. The radioactive antibody attaches itself to the drug. The
presence of a sought-after drug is detected by determining how
69. Id. at 1421.
70. See Montagne, Pugh & Fink, Testing for Drug Use, Part 1: Analytical Meth-
ods, 45 AM. J. Hosp. PHARMACY 1297, 1300-01 (1988); Finkle, Technological Issues
Associated with Monitoring Drug Use in the Workplace, in NAT'L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
AND ASSESSMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]; NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR WORKPLACE DRUG ABUSE POLICY, 11
(1989).
71. Montagne, Pugh & Fink, supra note 70, at 1299; Finkle, supra note 70, at 12.
72. The narrative below represents the author's simplification of processes that are
replete with technical terminology. For a more in-depth discussion, see Montagne, Pugh
& Fink, supra note 70; Finkle, supra note 70.
much radioactivity remains in the free, unattached portion of the
antibody solution.
3. Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique
(EMIT)
EMIT, like RIA, is an antibody method. This process involves
combining a urine specimen with an antibody test solution. The an-
tibody generally inhibits chemical reaction. However, if the drug
tested for is present in the urine, it combines with the antibodies and
allows the chemical reaction to take place. By measuring the extent
of the chemical reaction, one can determine whether the particular
drug is present.
4. Gas Chromatography and Mass Spectrometry (GC-
MS)
The GC-MS method is normally used to confirm initial TLC,
RIA, and EMIT screens. However, it can also be used as the pri-
mary method of analysis. This process involves separating drugs
from either blood or urine specimens by using a stream of hot gas.
The drugs are vaporized and individual compounds are separated
and recorded on a graph. Each drug is then shot into a mass spec-
trometer where its physical characteristics are analyzed; that is, its
mass (atomic weight) and spectrum are determined.
5. Accuracy and Reliability Issues
A fundamental concern of the labor community is the accuracy of
any testing method. Accuracy generally revolves around a test's sen-
sitivity and specificity. The skill of the technician performing the test
is also always important. For example, the TLC method can test for
many substances simultaneously and has reasonable specificity.
However, because it involves a great deal of subjective interpreta-
tion, the skill of the technician performing the test is critical. On the
other hand, the antibody methods have great sensitivity. They can
detect drugs at very low levels but they are relatively unspecific,
thereby increasing the potential of confusing one drug with
another."3
Because of the specificity and sensitivity of the GC-MS method,
there is some consensus that when done properly, this test is defini-
tive and eliminates the potential for false positives. It was apparently
for this reason that the Court found the procedures in Skinner and
Von Raab acceptable. It appears that the natural extension is that
73. See Montagne, Pugh & Fink, supra note 70, at 1299-1304; Finkle, supra note
70, at 13-20.
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confirmatory testing using the TLC or EMIT methods will remain
more susceptible to challenge than the GC-MS method.
Court rulings have already shown that failure to perform confir-
matory testing can lead to devastating results, as illustrated in Jones
v. McKenzie. 4 In that case, the District of Columbia School System
terminated an employee for violating a directive which prohibited
the use of drugs. The directive included a statement that a confirmed
finding of an illicit narcotic substance in the urine of an employee is
grounds for termination.75
Pursuant to the directive, the employee submitted to an initial
urinalysis done by computer; that test showed positive for THC me-
tabolites (marijuana). The test was then repeated manually and the
result was again positive for THC. The employee was then dis-
charged for marijuana use. Subsequently, she filed suit alleging,
among other things, that she was discharged solely on the basis of an
unconfirmed EMIT urinalysis. She argued this discharge violated
her constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process,
and violated the directives of the District of Columbia Board of Edu-
cation and Superintendent of Schools.76
The court agreed with the employee, focusing on the preponder-
ance of evidence in the record which recommended confirmation
testing by an alternative method. The court noted that the manufac-
turer of the EMIT test had a label which stated that a positive result
should be confirmed by an alternate method. In addition, the em-
ployee proffered reports issued by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the Journal of the American Medical Association, the United
States Center for Disease Control, and the United States Air Force
School for Aerospace Medicine, which recommended or mandated
confirmatory testing. Based on substantial evidence that a confirma-
tion test was essential, the Court concluded that the school system's
reliance on an unconfirmed EMIT test was arbitrary and
capricious.7
This issue was also raised in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v.
74. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). On the specific issue of confirmatory testing, the appellate court ruled that a
single EMIT test cannot pass constitutional muster.
75. Id. at 1502-03. In this case, the employer's procedure called for confirmation
of an initial positive result. In addition, the manufacturer's label warned that confirma-
tory testing should be done by an alternate method. The court's decision suggests that
even if these factors were absent, the EMIT test standing by itself is not accurate and
reliable enough to pass legal muster.
76. Id. at 1504.
77. Id. at 1506-07.
National Health Laboratories.8 In asking for a half-million dollars
in punitive damages, the San Diego utility alleged that the lab was
guilty of negligence, fraud, and breach of contract because it failed
to confirm an initial positive result, yet represented that a confirma-
tory test was done. In reliance on the lab's representations, the util-
ity refused to hire an applicant who then filed suit. As the utility
prepared to defend itself, it discovered that a confirmatory test was
not done and felt forced to settle out of court.
Therefore, there are strong indications that at a minimum, em-
ployers must perform some type of confirmatory testing to pass legal
muster. The GC-MS method appears to have the Court's imprima-
tur, while other methods remain more open to challenge. In the col-
lective bargaining context, long hours will still be spent fighting over
the accuracy and reliability of test results. As long as a case or issue
is significant to the union and medical experts disagree, the parties
in many instances will litigate or arbitrate the accuracy and reliabil-
ity issues.
6. Integrity of the Specimens
Aside from problems engendered in the tests themselves, many
other factors affect the integrity of the test result. From the outset,
an employer must ensure that the sample collected is not tainted. An
employee must be observed literally while giving the specimen to en-
sure this result. The problem of sample integrity is compounded by
the fact that drug-free urine is available for purchase in the open
market. Neither the Federal Railroad Administration in Skinner,
nor the Customs Service in Von Raab required visual observation of
the employee during urine collection."9 However, the Customs Ser-
vice took precautionary measures by having a monitor listen for the
normal sounds of urination. The sample was also checked to ensure
it had the proper color and temperature.8 0 In this way, the regula-
tions attempted to collect unadulterated samples, while at the same
time seeking to reduce intrusions on employees' privacy.
Once a specimen is collected, proper chain of custody procedures
must be followed to ensure that someone other than the provider
does not tamper with it. The specimen is also labeled properly to
avoid commingling, and appropriate preservation and storage proce-
dures are followed. In Skinner, the employees tested were trans-
ported to an independent medical facility for the collection of blood
and urine samples. The samples were then shipped to a Federal Rail-
78. No. 584380 (San Diego Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1987).
79. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1389.
80. Van Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
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road Administration laboratory for analysis.8 The Customs Service
employees in Von Raab also provided samples at an independent
medical facility. Samples were sealed and identified, placed in a
plastic bag which was sealed, then sent to a laboratory for testing.
Employees also executed chain of custody forms . 2
The Court approved of the collection and handling procedures in
both cases. Customs Service procedures, in particular, were detailed
and comprehensive. These procedures provided great assurance that
the integrity of the sample was protected. The Customs Service's ex-
clusive use of independent contractors for the entire procedure also
increased that assurance.
Quality assurance is another critical aspect of a lab's ability to
provide accurate and reliable results. There is a plethora of informa-
tion in the media documenting both the false positive and false nega-
tive dilemmas of labs. Because testing has become big business, labs
have sprung up overnight across the country. The likelihood of accu-
rate results is greatly diminished if labs do not have proper equip-
ment and highly trained personnel. Constant policing is necessary to
ensure that correct procedures are followed. In recognizing the im-
portance of accurate results, several states have begun licensing labs
and outlining personnel and equipment requirements.83
E. Implications of Court Decisions
The Court's rulings in Skinner and Von Raab do not leave public
employees at the whim of their employers' unfettered discretion in
the area of drug testing. Employees are still afforded protection
under several statutes and the common law.
1. Statutory Restrictions
In the field of drug and alcohol testing, confidentiality is of para-
mount importance. An employee tested for drugs or alcohol can gen-
erate a variety of medical data from various institutions. For exam-
ple, a company's medical department, its employee advisory service,
an independent lab, and a drug treatment facility might all collect
and maintain drug testing data for a single employee. However, nu-
merous statutory restrictions and guidelines intended to protect the
81. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1409.
82. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
83. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(10)(c)-(f) (West Supp. 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-122 (Supp. 1989).
confidentiality of medical records exist at both the federal and state
levels.
Several federal laws impose restrictions on a federal employer's
ability to release or disseminate medical information kept in connec-
tion with drug and alcohol testing. Section 408(a) of the Drug Abuse
Office and Treatment Act of 197284 states:
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient
which are maintained in connection with the performance of any drug
abuse prevention function conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly as-
sisted by any department or agency of the United States shall . . . be confi-
dential and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances
expressly authorized . . .85
Section 333(a) 86 contains an identical provision for alcohol abuse.
The federal Privacy Act of 197487 also sets parameters for disclos-
ing medical and other records of individuals kept by an agency. This
Act provides: "No agency shall disclose any record which is con-
tained in a system of records by any means of communication to any
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request
by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains .. "..88 The Act goes on to list the entities and cir-
cumstances exempted from this proscription. In addition to numer-
ous federal regulations protecting an employee's right to privacy,
some state codes have provisions specifically providing for confidenti-
ality of medical records.8 9
2. Common Law Protection
Employees' confidentiality and privacy are also afforded common
law protection. For example, in Houston Belt & Terminal Railway
v. Wherry,90 the Texas Supreme Court dealt with an employee's con-
tention that he was defamed by several of his employer's communi-
cations. The employee, Joe Wherry, was employed by the railroad as
a switchman. He sustained a knee injury while working and subse-
quently fainted, cutting his face. His cuts were treated by the com-
pany's chief surgeon who ran two tests to determine why the em-
ployee had fainted. One of the tests was a drug screen which came
back positive for a trace of methadone.
Several reports were generated because of the positive methadone
result. The company doctor prepared one of these reports, which in-
84. Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (Supp. V 1987).
86. Id. § 290dd-3.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
88. Id. § 552(b).
89. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51w, 31-128(a)-(h) (West 1987 & Supp.
1990).
90. 548 S.W. 2d 743 (Tex.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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cluded a statement that "'[t]he Drug screening test was positive for
methadone. Methadone is a drug which is often used to give heroin
addicts since it has essentially the same effects as heroin, but is
much less expensive. It can in some doses produce syncope . ...
This report was delivered to the superintendent of safety, who pre-
pared his own report. His report included a statement that
"'[1]aboratory results of the urine specimen was [sic] positive for
methadone, which is a synthetic drug commonly used in the with-
drawal treatment of heroin addicts.' "92 Seven other company offi-
cials received the superintendent's report through the normal acci-
dent reporting procedure.
Wherry was suspended pending an investigation and hearing. He
first learned of the methadone finding at the hearing. He denied ever
using heroin, methadone, or any other narcotic. Subsequently, he
gave another urinalysis and the report from this test stated that his
urine revealed the presence of a compound similar to methadone.
Further analysis showed the compound was not methadone or any
other commonly abused illegal drug. 93 Nonetheless, Wherry was dis-
missed for being an unsafe employee and for his failure to report the
accident in a timely fashion. He appealed his discharge under the
Railway Labor Act, but the discharge was affirmed by an arm of the
National Railway Adjustment Board.
Since Wherry was a veteran, he sought assistance from the Vet-
eran's Administration, contending that he was discharged without
cause. The Department of Labor then wrote the company inquiring
about Wherry's dismissal. The company's director of labor relations
responded in a letter, stating that Wherry was dismissed for violation
of safety and accident reporting rules. The director wrote: "'It was
also determined by the Doctor who examined Mr. Wherry following
his injury caused when Wherry passed out and fell, that traces of
methadone were present in Mr. Wherry's system, which constitutes
grounds for discharge under Uniform Code of Operating Rules, Rule
G.'-14 Rule G provides that the use of intoxicants or narcotics is
prohibited.
After analyzing all statements made about Wherry, the court
ruled that the company doctor's report was not libelous. The doctor
had accurately reported that only a "trace" of methadone was de-
91. Id. at 747.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 748.
94. Id. at 747.
tected and that, except upon further investigation, he could not say it
meant anything at all. The doctor intended to convey only the possi-
bility that Wherry was a heroin or methadone user, not that he was
an actual user. However, the court found the representations of other
company representatives libelous.9 r Both the superintendent and di-
rector of labor relations admitted that a good faith allegation could
not have been made that Wherry was a narcotics user.
The company contended that all writings were authored in good
faith and there was no ill will or malice intended towards Wherry. It
added that all communications were among persons who had a
strong interest in truthful reporting of the accident. Notwithstanding
these contentions, the court concluded that the representations by
these officials had the import and effect of defaming Wherry. The
court then affirmed the trial court's award of $150,000 compensatory
and $50,000 exemplary damages, finding sufficient evidence of mal-
ice to permit an award for punitive damages."'
Failure to properly limit disclosure of arguably confidential or pri-
vate information is also extremely damaging. This was shown in
Benassi v. Georgia Pacific, 7 when the employer announced to a
large gathering of employees that a certain manager was fired for
being drunk and misbehaving in a bar. The employee filed suit, argu-
ing the employer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the an-
nouncement was true. The court agreed with the employee and noted
that notwithstanding an employer's privilege to disseminate this type
of information, that privilege could be lost if the employer: (1) lacks
the belief or does not have reasonable grounds to believe the state-
ment is true; (2) abuses the privilege, that is, discloses information
for some purpose other than that for which the privilege was given;
(3) discloses information to some person not reasonably believed to
be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privilege;
or (4) discloses information not reasonably believed to be necessary
to accomplish the purpose of the privilege.98
However, under some circumstances an employee is precluded
from pursuing tort claims and is thereby forced to utilize grievance
or arbitration procedures, as shown in Strachan v. Union Oil Co.99
Management suspended two employees based on its suspicion that
one used drugs and the other had mental problems. Personnel meet-
ings were then held to discuss the employees' conduct. A decision
was made to conduct medical tests and examinations. Examinations
95. Id. at 748.
96. Id. at 753.
97. 62 Or. App. 698, 662 P.2d 760, modified, 63 Or. App. 672, 667 P.2d 532
(1983).
98. Id. at 709, 662 P.2d at 767.
99. 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
[VOL 27: 29, 1990] Employment Drug Testing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of both employees proved negative and they were promptly returned
to work. 00
Both employees filed suit in state court.' 0 ' The employee suspected
of drug use contended he was forced to allow a search of his person,
automobile, and locker. In addition, he asserted he was defamed be-
cause the company charged him with being a drug user or addict,
The employee suspected of having mental problems contended that
she was falsely imprisoned when she was asked to take a taxi to have
her medical examination. She also alleged defamation on the
grounds that the company charged her with having mental
problems. 02
The company removed the case to federal court where both the
district court and the court of appeals rejected the employees'
claims.0 3 In affirming the district court, the court of appeals held
that the essence of the employees' claims did. not constitute a tort
under state law. It added that investigations, medical examinations,
and issues related to blood and urine tests were questions arising
under the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the court
found that under the contract, the company had the right to insist
upon medical examinations when the physical condition of an em-
ployee was in doubt.104
The court held that the various employee claims demonstrate an
attempt to create major state court claims out of matters which are
all part of a company claim of right under a collective bargaining
agreement. Therefore, the employees' right to challenge the em-
ployer's conduct rests in the grievance procedure ending with bind-
ing arbitration. 0 5 The court further noted that the employees' con-
tentions were unsupported in the record. The inquiries and searches
made by the company were based on a reasonable suspicion, which
does not result in liability for defamation merely because it becomes
known in the plant. The court concluded that since there was no
showing of malice, the defamation claims under state law were pre-
empted by the grievance and arbitration procedures. 06
Because employees are afforded a variety of legal protections in
the areas of confidentiality and privacy, it behooves employers to
100. Id. at 704.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 706.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 705.
106. Id. at 706.
limit disclosure and third party access to testing information. Em-
ployers should only disseminate employees' medical records to per-
sons with a legitimate need to know. Employers can also set up per-
sonnel systems that separate medical records from records that do
not have strict confidentiality requirements. Of course, employee
consent prior to disclosure eliminates most defamation concerns.
F. Protection Under Handicap Discrimination Laws
1. Federal Laws
Handicap discrimination laws limit an employer's ability to disci-
pline, discharge, or refuse to hire an employee who is a drug or alco-
hol user, capable of performing the job. The federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973107 requires employers with government contracts exceed-
ing $2,500 to take affirmative action to employ qualified individu-
als.108 In addition, the Act proscribes recipients of federal funds
from discriminating against the handicapped. 09
The Act's application is limited to employees whose disabilities
substantially impair a major life activity or who have, or are per-
ceived to have, a past record of such disabilities. However, the Act
expressly excludes from its coverage individuals who are alcoholics
or drug abusers, whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents them
from performing the duties of the job in question, or whose employ-
ment, by reason of current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a
direct threat to property or the safety of others."a0 If an individual
qualifies under the statute's definition, an employer may be required
to make reasonable accommodation. This accommodation may re-
quire the employer to provide rehabilitation opportunities. The fol-
lowing cases illustrate.
In Healy v. Bergman,"' a federal district court addressed an alco-
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
108. The Act provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (in-
cluding construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring
that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting
with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment qualified handicapped individuals ....
Id. § 793(a).
109. It provides in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, .. shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794.
110. Id. § 706.
111. 609 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Mass. 1985).
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holic's contention that he was improperly discharged and had a pri-
vate right of action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. The
employee was hired by a government contractor, subject to the provi-
sions of Section 503, who had knowledge that the employee was an
alcoholic. Subsequently, the employee voluntarily admitted himself
into a detoxification facility where he stayed for approximately three
weeks. He then returned to work, and approximately one month
later, informed the company that he had to enter a rehabilitation
center for sixty days. He was told that the company did not approve
of his first hospitalization and if he again admitted himself, termina-
tion would result. Despite this warning, he admitted himself into re-
habilitation and was terminated." 2
During and after his hospitalization, he saw advertisements for his
former position and applied, but was refused employment. He filed a
complaint with the Office of the Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
gram (OFCCP) alleging discrimination. The regional office ruled he
was a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Act and
that his employer had unlawfully discriminated against him." 3 Sev-
eral months later the regional office changed its position, stating that
alcoholics currently receiving treatment are not qualified "handi-
capped individuals" under Section 503. The director of the national
office upheld the denial of the employee's claim on the ground that
alcoholics are not considered handicapped if their current abuse of
alcohol prevents them from performing their job.114
The employee then filed suit in federal district court alleging dis-
crimination under Section 503.115 The court found Section 503 silent
as to whether an individual is entitled to maintain a private cause of.
action against the employer. The court then reviewed a litany of
court rulings on this issue and the provision's legislative history. That
review resulted in the court holding that Section 503 does not confer
federal rights on handicapped individuals, but merely imposes cer-
tain obligations on government agencies."' "This is quite different
from Section 504 of the Act which confers directly upon qualified
handicapped individuals a right to be free from discrimination by
any recipient of federal funds.""1
7
The court then reviewed the OFCCP's final decision and pointed
112. Id. at 1450.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1451.
116. Id. at 1453.
117. Id.
out that the term "handicapped individual" is explicitly defined in
the Act. The court noted that for purposes of Sections 503 and 504,
the definition of "handicapped individual" does not include individu-
als whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents them from per-
forming the duties of the job in question, or whose employment
would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.,18
The court remanded the case to the Director of OFCCP, finding the
administrative record incomplete. The court requested the agency to
conclude its investigations and make detailed findings as to whether
the employee's alcoholism prevented him from performing his job,
and whether the company's dismissal and subsequent failure to re-
hire him constituted a violation of Section 503 of the Act.119
In interpreting the Act, some courts have held that former alcohol
or drug use qualifies under the Section 504 definition of handicap.
For example, in Davis v. Bucher 120 several applicants were denied
employment with the city of Philadelphia because of their prior his-
tories of drug abuse. 2 The applicants sued the city, contending that
they were denied employment solely on the basis of their former
drug usage, a decision made without regard to their qualifications,
present rehabilitative status, or the nature of the job for which they
applied. Counsel for the city stipulated that the applicants were fully
qualified for the jobs and would have been hired absent physical evi-
dence and admission of prior drug use. 22
The federal district court stated that as a matter of public policy,
it was Congress' intent to include past drug users within the protec-
tions of the Act. Relying on the statutory definition of "handicap,"
in conjunction with an analysis provided by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, and a legal opinion by the Attorney
General, the court concluded that drug addiction and alcoholism are
physical' or mental impairments within the meaning of Section
706(6)(C) of the Act.'23 However, the court emphasized in a lengthy
footnote that its decision was limited to those situations where a
qualified person is discriminated against solely because of the handi-
cap. The court pointed out that an employer may still consider past
personnel records, absenteeism, disruptive, abusive, or dangerous be-
havior, violations of rules, and unsatisfactory work performance
when making an employment decision about an alcoholic or drug
addict. 12 4
118. Id. at 1455-56.
119. Id. at 1456.
120. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
121. Id. at 793.
122. Id. at 794.
123. Id. at 796.
124. Id. at 797 n.4.
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The federal courts further interpreted Section 504 in regard to
willful misconduct in Tinch v. Walters.125 In this case, a veteran,
William Tinch, alleged that Section 504 rendered ineffective a Vet-
eran's Administration (VA) regulation which equated primary alco-
holism with willful misconduct. Tinch attempted to take advantage
of a VA regulation extending the time during which educational
benefits are available to veterans. However, the extension was not
available to veterans whose handicap was a result of their willful
misconduct. 2
Tinch filed for an extension, contending that he was unable to pur-
sue his education from 1966 to 1974 because of his alcohol addiction
and its associated social, psychological, emotional, and physical de-
bilitations. Tinch's claim was denied on the ground that his alcohol-
ism constituted "willful misconduct" as defined by the VA regula-
tion.1 27  In other words, it was "an act involving conscious
wrongdoing or known prohibited action.' 28
After denial of all administrative appeals, Tinch filed suit in fed-
eral district court contending, among other things, that the VA pol-
icy of treating primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" violated
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'2 9 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Tinch on his 504 claim,3 0 and the
appellate court affirmed.' 3' In ruling that Tinch, a recovered alco-
holic, was an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act,' 32 and therefore protected from
discrimination solely on the basis of this status, the appellate court
held that the "willful misconduct regulation discriminates against
Mr. Tinch on the basis of his handicap, primary alcoholism."' The
court stated:
By presuming that primary alcoholics are disabled solely due to their own
willful misconduct, the [Board of Veteran Appeals] interpretation of the
regulation precludes it from considering relevant evidence which is causally
125. 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985).
126. See 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (1988).
127. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1989) ("If, in the drinking of a beverage to
enjoy its intoxicating effects, intoxication results proximately and immediately in disabil-
ity or death, the disability or death will be considered the result of the person's willful
misconduct.").
128. Tinch, 765 F.2d at 601.
129. Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), affd, 765 F.2d 599
(6th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 349.
131. Tinch, 765 F.2d at 604.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
133. Tinch, 765 F.2d at 603.
related to the handicap of primary alcoholism. Because primary alcoholism
is presumed to result from lack of will, no finding of fact regarding the
cause of the disease can legally rebut the presumption of willful miscon-
duct. Due to this interpretation, a showing that an individual suffers from
alcoholism as a primary disease, without an underlying psychiatric disorder
or secondary illness, automatically presumes the alcoholic veteran has en-
gaged in willful misconduct.""'
The court also compared alcoholism to other diseases, since the
VA regulation provided, "a primary alcoholic who acquires an or-
ganic disability as a result of his alcoholism is not barred by the
willful misconduct provision, if the organic disability-rather than
the primary alcoholism-prevents use of the educational benefits
within the basic period prescribed . . . . 13' The VA had concluded
that Tinch's organic disabilities, that is, his impaired liver functions,
were not severe enough to seriously interfere with his educational
pursuits. 136 On this issue the court stated:
Unlike those who suffer from primary alcoholism, veterans who suffer from
other maladies including other forms of alcoholism, are not required to
prove the existence of a secondary disease in order to escape a presumption
of willful misconduct with respect to their primary condition. Thus, the con-
clusive presumption of willfulness is only directed at primary alcoholics, and
constitutes discrimination on the basis of their handicap.
131
If an employee's condition is covered by a federal handicap stat-
ute, the employer may have to accommodate the employee. The
court in Whitlock v. Donovan'38 provides a good discussion on this
issue. In Whitlock, an employee of the Department of Labor was
discharged because of repeated absences caused by alcoholism. The
employee filed suit, contending that the Department of Labor failed
to meet its statutory obligation to reasonably accommodate his hand-
icap. Specifically, he alleged that his employer (1) was not suffi-
ciently forceful in outlining the choice between obtaining treatment
or losing his job; (2) failed to follow up on post therapy treatment;
and (3) failed to give the reasonable options of a lengthy leave with-
out pay for intensive in-patient treatment or accepting disability
retirement. 39
It was not disputed that alcoholism is a handicap covered by the
Rehabilitation Act. However, the court ruled that Section 501 and
not Section 504, applied to the case. The court reasoned that the
legislative history of Section 504 supports the proposition that the
provision has no application to alcoholics or drug abusers whose cur-
rent use of alcohol or drugs prevents them from doing their job. The
134. Id.
135. Id. at 600.
136. Id. at 601.
137. Id. at 603-04.
138. 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 964 (Ist Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 129.
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court concluded that alcoholics and drug abusers in need of rehabili-
tation fall outside the ambit of the statutory definition of "handi-
capped individuals."' 40 The court then proceeded to analyze the case
on the basis of federal regulations, 4 which require agency employ-
ers to make "reasonable accommodations" for the known physical or
mental limitations of a qualified handicapped employee, provided the
accommodations do not impose an undue burden on the operations of
the employer. The court also looked to protection afforded federal
employees under the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970.142
Once the legislative history of the statutory and regulatory obliga-
tions of federal employers was reviewed, the court concluded that it
was Congress' intent to require federal employers to exert "substan-
tial affirmative efforts"'143 to assist alcoholic employees in overcoming
their handicap before firing them for alcohol related performance de-
ficiencies. Particularly, the employer is first obligated to offer coun-
seling. If the employee refuses and work deficiencies persist, the
"firm choice" of treatment or discipline is presented to the employee.
Finally, the agency must follow through on any "firm choice" deci-
sion made.14 The court ultimately found that even though the De-
partment of Labor was compassionate, tolerant, and more patient
than most other employers, it nonetheless fell short of its statutory
mandate to accommodate handicapped employees. 45 Among other
things, the court found that the employer did not satisfy the "firm
choice" requirement by mandating that the employee either re-enter
the program from which he had withdrawn or face serious
discipline.' 41
The accommodation issue was also addressed in Walker v. Wein-
berger. 47 Clarence Walker was hired by Defense Printing Service in
1978. He developed attendance problems and was- disciplined with
increasing severity, until discharge was imminent in 1980. He then
informed the agency that he was an alcoholic, and his proposed re-
moval was reduced to a ten-day suspension. This action allowed him
140. Id. at 129-30.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1989).
142. Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 130-38; see also 42 U.S.C. § 290 dd-l(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1987).
143. Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 131.
144. Id. at 134.
145. Id. at 136.
146. Id. at 137-38.
147. 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985).
to utilize the government alcohol counseling and assistance program.
Upon completing the program, alcohol ceased to be the cause of any
work related problems.148
Three months after rehabilitation, he was progressively disciplined
for new attendance problems, and he was eventually terminated. He
appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the hearing
officer reduced the discharge to a thirty-day suspension. The Board
disagreed with the hearing officer and reinstated the termination, ex-
pressly relying on Walker's pretreatment record in conjunction with
his post-treatment violations.149
Walker filed suit contending that termination might be appropri-
ate if his pretreatment and post-treatment disciplinary records could
properly be considered together. However, he argued that, "an indis-
criminate combination of both sets of violations to justify a penalty
supposedly proportionate to the total culpability they purport to re-
flect is inconsistent with the anti-discrimination statutes and regula-
tions, because it effectively punishes him for what has been legisla-
tively decreed an illness."'' 0 The employer contended Walker was
"reasonably accommodated" when his initial discharge was reduced
to a ten-day suspension and he was allowed to participate in a gov-
ernment affiliated alcohol program.1 '
The court disagreed with the employer, holding:
[A]n agency does not "reasonably accommodate" an alcoholic employee by
keeping score of alcohol-induced, pre-treatment transgressions and reviving
them post-treatment for purposes of cumulation with non-alcohol-related
misconduct to produce an aggregate disciplinary record warranting more
severe punishment. Pre-treatment records certainly remain relevant to
gauge how successful treatment has been, or whether the disease process is
so far advanced as to be unamenable to treatment or accommodation. In a
disciplinary context, however, "reasonable accommodation" of an alcoholic
employee requires forgiveness of his past alcohol-induced misconduct in
proportion to his willingness to undergo and favorable response to treat-
ment. Use of pre-treatment records conceded to be attributable to alcohol
abuse for disciplinary purposes is inconsistent with the legislative perception
of alcoholism as a disease, and behavioral problems a part of the symptom-
atology rather than the product of volitional acts of dissipation. Moreover,
knowledge that his employer may resurrect his alcohol-related infractions
for penalty-enhancement purposes if he errs in the future may well be a
disincentive for the alcoholic employee to enter, continue or complete neces-
sary treatment.10'
148. Id. at 759-60.
149. Id. at 760.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 761-62.
152. Id. at 762 (citation omitted).
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2. State and Local Laws
Besides the protection afforded by federal handicap statutes, state
and local legislation may also provide grounds for discrimination
challenges. Since there is no uniform state and local approach to this
issue, a check of each jurisdiction's code and regulations is required
to determine whether drug and alcohol abuse qualify as handicaps.
Local laws will also state whether accommodation of any sort is
required.
For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that alcoholism is
not a handicap as defined under its state statute. In Welsh v. Munic-
ipality of Anchorage,153 employee Darnell Welsh was discharged af-
ter his driver's license was revoked for driving while intoxicated. His
job required possession of a driver's license. 54 Welsh sued in state
court, arguing that the true reason for his discharge was his alcohol-
ism. 5 He contended that his discharge constituted discrimination
inasmuch as alcoholism is a physical handicap, as defined by
statute. 1e
The statute in question provides: "'Physical handicap' means any
physical disability, infirmity, malformation, or disfigurement which
is caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness including diabetes,
epilepsy, and including any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of
physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, or other reme-
dial appliance or device."'57 In rejecting Welsh's contention, the
court ruled that even if Welsh was medically correct in asserting
that he suffered from the illness of alcoholism, his condition did not
constitute a physical handicap as defined by the statute. Therefore, a
discharge on account of his condition was not discrimination. 58
A similar result was reached in Biltz v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.159
Paul Biltz, a pilot, had a drinking problem which caused poor at-
tendance and work performance. As a result, the airline scheduled
him for a checkup and he was diagnosed as an alcoholic. Conse-
quently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revoked his
first-class medical certificate and grounded him. Biltz consulted
other doctors in an attempt to refute the diagnosis. He was subse-
153. 676 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1984).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 603.
156. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, CODE § 5.20.010(A).
157. Id. § 5.20.010(N).
158. Welsh, 676 P.2d at 603.
159. 363 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
quently reexamined by the company doctor and the diagnosis of al-
coholism was confirmed. Biltz maintained that he was not an alco-
holic, refused treatment, and stated that he had no plans to seek
treatment. This resulted in his termination. 160
Biltz sued in state court, alleging violations of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act and Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. The company removed the case to federal district court. The
Section 503 claim was dismissed, and the remaining claims were re-
manded for state court resolution.' 6'
In addressing Biltz's discrimination contention, the state court
noted that it was unclear whether alcoholism was a disability under
the 1976 version of the Human Rights Act, and the court pointed to
the Minnesota Supreme Court's specific refusal to address that ques-
tion. However, the court ruled that it need not address this issue
because the airline had a valid defense premised on a provision
which allows employers to discriminate based on bona fide occupa-
tional criteria. The court found the defense applicable since Biltz
lacked a bona fide occupational qualification: a valid medical certifi-
cate. 62 In addition, the court found that Biltz refused to undergo
treatment to regain his medical certificate. 6 3
However, in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor & Human Resources,"6 4 a Wisconsin em-
ployee diagnosed as an alcoholic by a medical expert was protected
by statute. Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act'60 outlines the state's
policy proscribing employment discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap. The Act states that an employer falls within its provisions if the
employer terminates an employee on the basis of a handicap, unless
such handicaps are "reasonably related to the individual's ability to
adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individ-
ual's employment .... ,6
It is not uncommon for employers to place alcohol on a separate
footing from drugs when designing their drug and alcohol policies.
This separation is required to the extent that the units of measure-
ment for each substance is different. A policy will generally also set
out a schedule of discipline, up to and including discharge, that cor-
relates with levels of intoxication.
Not surprisingly, many policies provide for lesser discipline for al-
cohol infractions, notwithstanding the fact that alcohol remains the
160. Id. at 96.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 97.
163. Id.
164. 86 Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979).
165. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.395 (West 1988).
166. Id. § 111.32(a).
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number one abused drug. Lesser discipline for alcohol violations is
sometimes justified solely on the basis that its consumption is legal.
Buttressed by legal recognition, society's attitude about alcohol
abuse has grown to one of acceptance and accommodation, while
drug abuse seems to trigger condemnation and punishment. Drug
and alcohol policies tend to mirror societal attitudes, resulting in le-
niency or assistance for alcohol abusers. The decision to treat alcohol
as a special category might also stem from top management's reflec-
tion on their own alcohol consumption practices. In any event, em-
ployers unwilling to treat the substances differently or make ac-
comodations are constrained by statutory provisions and common
law.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR CHALLENGES
Private sector employers are also active in the field of drug testing.
Like the public employers, private employers implementing drug
testing programs face challenges in legal and administrative forums.
In situations where a collective bargaining contract governs the em-
ployer and employee relationship, the parties are bound by the
agreement. Provisions in the contract providing for drug and alcohol
testing will control the employer's drug screening activities. In in-
stances where the collective bargaining agreement is silent on the
issue, the employer in all likelihood will have to bargain with the
union before implementing a policy.
The necessity to bargain stems from the requirement in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 167 that employers and unions
bargain in good faith with respect to terms and conditions of em-
ployment. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has gener-
ally ruled that changes in work rules that affect terms and conditions
of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining.'
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
168. The parties' bargaining obligation is set out in sections 8(d) and 9(a) of the
NLRA. Section 8(d) provides: "For purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment .... .
National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Additionally, section
9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment ....
A. Johnson-Bateman and Star Tribune
In June 1989, the NLRB ruled that drug testing policies affect
terms and conditions of employment and, therefore, qualify as
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The cases that brought drug test-
ing before the NLRB were Johnson-Bateman Co.'6 " and Star
Tribune.170
In Johnson-Bateman, the company implemented a policy in De-
cember 1986 which stated that employees sustaining injuries requir-
ing medical treatment will be given a drug and alcohol test. The
policy was triggered by a significant increase in work related acci-
dents and a sharp increase in insurance rates. The union objected,
and noted that it was not contacted to negotiate the policy. However,
the union had not objected to previous policies instituted by the com-
pany which provided for drug and alcohol testing of hirees. Company
policies also provided for discipline and discharge of incumbents who
consumed or possessed alcohol on company time or premises, or who
reported to work while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.lL.
The union filed a complaint, alleging that the testing program re-
lated to terms and conditions of employment and was therefore a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Therefore, the company's unilat-
eral implementation of the program without notice and without an
opportunity to bargain, constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act.172 The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) agreed with the union, and found that the policy to test cur-
rent employees was not a company rule as contemplated by the man-
agement rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The
ALJ ruled that although the provision reserved to the company the
right to issue, change, and enforce rules, the testing policy fell
outside the provision. The ALJ also found that the union had not
waived its right to bargain about the policy, and unilateral imple-
mentation constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 17 3
The NLRB agreed with the Administrative Law Judge, citing the
Id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). This language has been interpreted to mean that
bargaining must take place on the subjects listed. Issues that do not qualify as wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are treated as "permissive" sub-jects, and bargaining is not required. There is some debate as to whether Congress in-
tended to legislate what subjects the parties must bargain over, and the Court responded
to that issue in the affirmative. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (mandatory
subjects); ef. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Wagner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(permissive subjects).
169. 295 N.L.R.B. 26 (June 15, 1989).
170. 295 N.L.R.B. 63 (June 15, 1989).
171. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip-op. at 4-5.
172. Id. at 6. Section 8(a)(5) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to bargain with representatives of his employees subject to the provisions
of section 9(a) of the NLRA. See supra note 168.
173. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 6-7.
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Supreme Court's standards for determining mandatory subjects of
bargaining.174 Previously, the Court held in Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v. NLRB,17 5 that mandatory subjects of bargaining are
matters that are plainly germane to the working environment and
not among those decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control. 1 16 The NLRB found drug testing analogous to physical ex-
aminations 177 and polygraph testing, 7 1 which were mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. The NLRB found that the testing policy
changed the method by which workplace accidents were investigated
and comprised a "relatively sophisticated technology, substantially
varying both the mode of investigation and the character of proof on
which an employee's job security might depend.' 79 On this basis,
the NLRB found that drug and alcohol testing requirements were
germane to the working environment.
The NLRB next assessed the policy under the "core of en-
trepreneurial control" standard. It turned to the Supreme Court's
language in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 80 and Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion in Fibreboard.18' Justice Stewart in Fibreboard es-
sentially noted that entrepreneurial questions-what to produce, how
to invest capital, and what the basic scope of the enterprise should
be-are subjects properly left to management's direction and con-
trol.8 2 The NLRB in Johnson-Bateman found that the employer's
174. Id. at 8.
175. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
176. Id. at 222-23 (Stewart, J., concurring). This standard or conclusion articu-
lated by the Court has done little to illuminate which subjects are mandatory and which
are not. However, the decision recognized the NLRB's special expertise in classifying
subjects, and set out some considerations to be used when evaluating a particular situa-
tion. For example, if the issue is a matter of deep concern to employees, does not usurp
management's right to run the business, and is amenable to resolution in the collective
bargaining process, a finding of mandatory subject is likely. The Court views bargaining
under such circumstances as promoting industrial peace by funnelling into the negotia-
tion process substantial disputes which would otherwise only be resolvable through indus-
trial warfare.
177. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 8. For discussions on the
physical examination requirement, see Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 171
(1984) and LeRoy Machine Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
178. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 8. Medicenter, Mid-South
Hospital, 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975) and Austin Berryhill, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1139
(1979) offer discussion on this issue.
179. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 10-11.
180. 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
181. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 379 U.S. at 223. (Stewart, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 223. Although this standard was noted in the case, the majority found
that the company's decision to subcontract bargaining unit work, based on a study that
showed cost savings in doing so, fell within the literal meaning of terms and conditions of
testing policy "[did] not involve the commitment of investment capi-
tal and [was not a decision premised on] changing the scope or na-
ture of the . ..enterprise. It is rather a more limited decision di-
rected toward reducing workplace accidents and attendant insurance
rates."1
3
The second decision, Star Tribune, dealt with testing of job appli-
cants and the union's entitlement to testing information. 18 The
NLRB found that applicants were not bargaining unit employees as
contemplated by the NLRA, and that the testing policy did not "vi-
tally affect""8 " the terms and conditions of employment or the work-
ing environment of existing employees. As a result, the employer had
no statutory duty to bargain. 8 6
For its analysis on whether the NLRA protects applicants, the
NLRB turned to the Supreme Court's Pittsburgh Plate Glass'1 7 de-
cision, in which the Court discussed the scope of mandatory subjects
of bargaining as it related to retired workers' rights to coverage
under a company-provided health insurance plan. The Court found
that retired workers were not covered by the statutory definition of
"employees" provided in Section 2(3) of the NLRA.18 Hence, the
statutory duty to bargain did not extend to terms and conditions of
employment in Section 8(d) of the NLRA. The Court felt particularly convinced that
subcontracting under the circumstances was a mandatory subject since it required termi-
nation of the affected employees. It concluded that the issue was of vital concern to labor
and management, and industrial experience showed it was amenable to resolution in the
collective bargaining process. Id. at 213-14; see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (Employer's decision to terminate business with one of its
clients was a decision on the scope and direction of the enterprise and, therefore, not a
mandatory subject).
183. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 12.
184. Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 3.
185. Id. at 12. The "vitally affect" standard was first reviewed in Allied Chem. &
Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
186. 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 16.
187. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157
(1971).
188. Id. at 168. Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides,
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless the [NLRA] explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act, as amended from time to time or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
'National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). A literal reading of
the provision suggests that if the employment relationship were severed for some reason
not violative of the NLRA, the departing individual ceases to be an employee.
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employment of retired employees' insurance benefits. The Court
noted that the term "employee" simply referred to those who work
for another for hire.189
Reasoning from the Court's discussion, the NLRB in Star Trib-
une held that applicants do not fall under the ordinary definition of
employee. "Applicants perform no services for the employer, are
paid no wages, and are under no restrictions as to other employment
or activities."' 9 The NLRB noted that applicants cannot vote in
elections and are not part of the unit for representation purposes.
The NLRB further found that applicants did not have an economic
relationship with the employer and it was speculative whether such a
relationship would arise. The NLRB concluded that applicants did
not share a broad enough "community of interest" with active em-
ployees to justify their inclusion in the bargaining unit.19'
Next, the NLRB discussed whether the employer was nonetheless
obligated to bargain about matters affecting individuals outside the
bargaining unit because those matters impacted the terms and condi-
tions of unit employees. The NLRB turned to the Court's Pittsburgh
Plate Glass decision and its own United Technologies Corp. 92 deci-
sion for standards on this issue. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court
ruled that the appropriate inquiry is whether the nonemployees' in-
terests "vitally affect" the terms and conditions of employment of
unit members. In addition, the Court emphasized that this standard
is not satisfied if the impact on unit employees' interests is specula-
tive or insubstantial.' Referring to United Technologies, the
NLRB noted:
An indirect or incidental impact on unit employees is not sufficient to estab-
lish a matter as a mandatory subject. Rather, mandatory subjects include
only those matters that materially or significantly affect unit employees'
terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, the phrase "terms and con-
ditions of employment" is to be construed in a limited sense and does not
include all subjects that may merely be of interest or concern to the
189. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 166.
190. Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 11.
191. Id. The "community of interest" standard was developed by the NLRB in an
attempt to carry out its statutory mandate of "unit" determination under Section 9(b) of
the NLRA. Since the NLRA provides little guidance on how the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining will be determined, the NLRB considers numerous factors when
making unit determinations. Those factors include similarity of qualifications, work,
wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment, contact and interchange
of employees, their geographic proximity to each other, their collective bargaining his-
tory, and so on. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 173.
192. 274 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1985), enforced, 789 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1986).
193. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 179.
parties.""
The NLRB therefore rejected the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that the composition of the bargaining unit was "vitally
affected" by the testing of applicants. The NLRB also disagreed
with the conclusion that such testing "vitally affected" workplace
safety, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining.'0 0 The NLRB
then discussed whether the union was entitled to applicant testing
information. 1 6 It found that the employer violated sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by refusing to furnish information to the
union regarding the identity of applicants subjected to the policy and
the employer's final determinations vis-A-vis those applicants. 9 7
To decide this issue, the NLRB relied on a nondiscrimination
clause in the collective bargaining agreement, 9 8 and the national la-
bor policy denouncing employment discrimination. 19 9 A provision in
the collective bargaining agreement prohibited discrimination in the
hiring process. The union claimed it needed applicant testing infor-
mation to determine whether testing procedures were uniformly ap-
plied to male and female applicants.200 Based on previous NLRB
and federal court decisions holding that the elimination of actual or
194. Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 14.
195. Id. at 15.
196. Id. at 16-17.
197. Id. at 20.
198. Id. at 4. The clause in question provides: "The Publisher prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of race, color, . . . sex. . . .All phases of employment
are covered by this policy, including but not limited to: recruiting . . . testing and hiring
." Id. Such clauses are generally found in collective bargaining agreements, and
serve as some evidence of the employer's commitment to race and gender neutral employ-
ment practices. The presence of this provision gives the union a contractual right to chal-
lenge employer practices that are arguably discriminatory. This contractual right is in
addition to federal rights provided by statutes which prohibit discrimination. See infra
note 199.
199. Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 18. The NLRB cited the Court's
decisions in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Despite its recogni-
tion in Emporium Capwell that nondiscrimination is a matter of highest priority, the
Court found that the principles of majority rule and exclusivity embodied in section 9(a)
of the NLRA outweighed black employees' interests in personally negotiating a remedy
with the employer for discriminatory practices. Therefore, Emporium Capwell does not
necessarily stand for the proposition that nondiscrimination is paramount in national la-
bor policy. Gardner-Denver is more on point with respect to the supremacy of federal
laws prohibiting discrimination over protections afforded by the majority representative
and a collective bargaining agreement. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held that an em-
ployee's right to sue an employer for discriminatory conduct is not waived, even though
the same allegations were made and found without basis in the grievance and arbitration
processes. See also Steele v. Louisville & L.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Steele is a Rail-
way Labor Act (RLA) case-that deals directly with the issue of discrimination. Like the
NLRA, the RLA embodies principles of majority rule and exclusivity for the bargaining
representative. The Court found that the union's discriminatory conduct towards black
employees was irrelevant, invidious, and not authorized by Congress.
200. Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63, slip op. at 16-17.
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suspected sex discrimination is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the NLRB had ample support to conclude that the employer must
provide the requested information. °1 It found discrimination in the
hiring process so closely linked to discrimination in employment, that
limiting the union's ability to police that process would greatly im-
pede the union in carrying out its statutory obligation. Information
about actual or suspected discrimination was therefore found to be
necessary and relevant.20 2
Prior to the NLRB's pronouncements, federal courts had ad-
dressed the drug testing issue. In most instances, when employers
unilaterally implemented policies while collective bargaining agree-
ments were in existence, unions sought injunctive relief in federal
courts. Generally, the district courts responded by having the parties
revert to the arbitral forum to resolve this issue. The following cases
are examples of this procedure.
In Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers v. Boise Cas-
cade Corp.,2 °3 the union challenged Boise Cascade's unilateral im-
plementation of a drug testing policy, alleging that the policy vio-
lated employees' common law privacy rights.2 °4 The district court
ruled that the collective bargaining agreement allowed the union to
contest the reasonability of the rules, and that the union should chal-
lenge the rules through arbitration in an appropriate forum before
resorting to the courts. The request for injunctive relief was there-
fore denied. 5
In IBEW Local System Council U-9 v. Metropolitan Edison,0 6
the union challenged Metropolitan Edison's attempt to expand its
drug testing program to include random testing. The union was
granted a temporary restraining order blocking random testing,
pending arbitration of the whole policy. Also, in Local 1900, IBEW
v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 07 the union challenged the com-
pany's unilateral revision and implementation of its drug and alcohol
policy allowing for random testing of employees. The union con-
tended that the policy violated the collective bargaining agreement.
Although a temporary restraining order was granted, a preliminary
201. Id. at 18.
202. Id. at 20.
203. 644 F. Supp. 183 (D. Or. 1986).
204. Id. at 185.
205. Id. at 187.
206. No. 86-4426 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986) (1986 Westlaw 376).
207. 634 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
injunction was denied pending arbitration of the policy. 08
This deference to nonjudicial forums continues, as evidenced by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association. °" In Consolidated Rail,
the employer, Conrail, unilaterally amended its physical examination
policy by adding drug testing to its medical standards. As a result,
employees subjected to periodic or return-to-duty physicals were
screened for drugs by urinalysis.21 0 The union sued, arguing that this
drug testing requirement violated the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and was inconsistent with past practice.1
The issue tackled by the Court was whether Conrail's action con-
stituted an assertion of a right under the collective bargaining agree-
ment and was therefore arbitrable, or whether the action was an at-
tempt to create a right, and therefore nonarbitrable. Although the
case arose under the Railway Labor Act (RLA),21 2 the underlying
policies governing the analysis is similar to that of the NLRA. 213
Under the RLA, disputes are characterized as "minor" or "ma-
jor."214 Contract disputes are deemed minor and must utilize the
compulsory and binding arbitration procedures of the RLA.215 Dis-
putes concerning attempts to create new and additional rights are
regarded as major, and are controlled by a bargaining, mediation,
and economic force procedure. 16
208. Id. at 645.
209. I09,S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
210. Id. at 2479.
211. Id. at 2487. The union's challenge initially dealt with Conrail's use of drug
testing to enforce Rule G. The addition of testing to physical examinations came later.
212. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
213. See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943) (noting similarity
in national interest expressed by both NLRA and RLA). But see Chicago & N.W.R.
Co. v. Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971) (offering word of caution when draw-
ing parallels between the NLRA and RLA).
Both the NLRA and RLA promote the friendly adjustment of disputes through collec-
tive bargaining, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The idea is that industrial peace
can be best achieved through resolutions worked out by the parties, or alternatively, with
the involvement or assistance of a nonjudicial neutral.
214. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), affd on rehearing, 327
U.S. 661 (1946). The Court coined the terms "major" and "minor" based on distinctions
in the RLA, legislative history of railway labor statutes, and "the history of railway labor
disputes." Id. at 722-23. The specific characterization of "major" and "minor" cannot be
found in the RLA, but is mentioned in the legislative hearings. Railway Labor Act:
Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 47 (1934) (Statement of Comm'r Eastman).
215. The definition and mechanics of a minor dispute under the RLA are analo-
gous to the grievance arbitration mechanism under the NLRA. See 45 U.S.C. § 153
(1982); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
216. The definition and procedures for a major dispute are similar to mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the NLRA. In both the RLA and NLRA, Congress set out
the parties' bargaining and dispute resolution obligations. In the case of the RLA, sec-
tions 2 Sixth and 3 First (i) address disputes relating to the application or interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 Sixth, 153 First (i) (1982); cf.
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The district court found the testing was implicitly supported by
the contract and, therefore, a minor dispute.11 7 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the district court improperly interpreted Con-
rail's rights under the contract.2 18 The Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing the addition of the drug testing to routine physical examinations
a minor dispute.21 9
The Court identified several factors supporting Conrail's right to
amend the contractual terms in the parties' agreement. For example,
it was established that the union had historically acquiesced to phys-
ical examinations of employees, and that this was now a term im-
plied in the contract. These examinations included some urinalysis
testing and screening for drugs, either when the examining doctor
felt drugs were being used, or when the employee returned to work
from a drug-related absence. Conrail had also modified its medical
procedures in the past without challenge from the union.22 °
The union contended that its acquiescence to the drug testing
practice was limited to testing "for cause. 2 In addition, it noted
that the previous policy only provided for suspension, while the new
policy allowed for discharge. Finally, it argued that the policy was
attempting to regulate employees' off-duty conduct.22
The Court responded by suggesting that the union make its argu-
ments at arbitration because the only issue it had to resolve was
whether the controversy was a major or a minor dispute.223 To re-
solve this issue, the Court assessed the validity of Conrail's claim
that its actions under the agreement were "obviously insubstan-
tial. 224 It found that "Conrail's interpretation of the range of its
discretion as extending to drug testing is supported by the general
breadth of its freedom of action in the past, and by its practice of
including drug testing within routine medical examinations in some
supra note 168 (bargaining and dispute resolution obligation under the NLRA). Sections
2 Seventh (29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982)) and 6 (45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982)) address attempts
to create new rights outside the contract. Congress did not characterize the parties' dis-
putes or obligations in either the RLA or NLRA, but the Court has. The parties' obliga-
tion and procedures to be followed when disputes qualify as "major" under the RLA is
almost identical to that for "mandatory" subjects under the NLRA. As a result, lower
federal courts have been using these terms interchangeably.
217. Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 1479.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 2485.
220. Id. at 2486.
221. Id. at 2487.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2487-88.
circumstances. '225  The broad discretion granted the company,
through union acquiescence, apparently convinced the Court that
further expansion by Conrail in this area was consistent with past
practice.
The Consolidated Rail decision leaves the door open for debate on
this issue. One interpretation is to limit the case to its facts and ar-
gue that it does not explain the Court's general position on private
sector testing. In any event, the Court gave a clear signal that there
is more to say on this issue, by granting certiorari to Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern Railroad.226 Burling-
ton is another RLA case decided by the Ninth Circuit. This case
dealt with an employer's unilateral implementation of a drug policy.
In Burlington, the company, responding to several serious acci-
dents, implemented a new rule of general testing of employees in-
volved in incidents attributable to human error. The rule would not
apply when the cause of the accident was clearly known. The com-
pany refused to negotiate the policy and the union sued to enjoin its
implementation.2
The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, basing
its decision on its finding that the dispute was minor.2 8 The court
noted that the company had a rule prohibiting the possession and use
of drugs and alcohol. 229 The rule was neither a part of the collective
bargaining agreement nor incorporated into the agreement by refer-
ence.230 Nevertheless, the court found that the union had acquiesced
in the rule's enforcement for approximately forty years.23 1
The union conceded that the old rule was an implied contractual
term, but argued that its acquiescence was limited to enforcement
through sensory policing by supervisors. As a result, employees were
only tested when they displayed specific signs of impairment. None-
225. Id.
226. 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), cert granted, 109 S. Ct. 3207 (1989); see also
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington N.R.R., 838 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988)
(companion case decided the same day which held that the company's use of sniffer dogs
to detect alcohol and drug use is a "major" dispute).
227. Burlington, 838 F.2d at 1089. The union's demand that the company negoti-
ate is premised on its belief that implementation of the policy is a "major" dispute under
the RLA. If a dispute is major, the RLA requires maintenance of the status quo until
statutory procedures are exhausted. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). In addition, federal courts
have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in furtherance of the statutory mandate.
In resolving the issues presented by this case, the court relied on its factual findings in
the companion "sniffer dog" case. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington
N.R.R., 620 F. Supp. 163 (D. Mont. 1985) [hereinafter Burlington 1], aft d, 838 F.2d
1102 (9th Cir. 1988); see also supra note 226.
228. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington, 620 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D.
Mont. 1985) [hereinafter Burlington 11], rev'd, 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 3207 (1989).
229. Id. at 174; see also Burlington I, 620 F. Supp. at 169.
230. See Burlington I, 620 F. Supp. at 169.
231. Id. at 166; see Burlington II, 620 F. Supp. at 175.
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theless, the court found that the new policy was closely related to the
type of testing to which the union acquiesced. Hence, the Company
was "arguably justified" ' in instituting the procedure under the im-
plied contract term.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the dispute was "ma-
jor."2 33 It determined that under the RLA, parties are required "to
bargain over any proposal whose primary impact is the loss-or po-
tential loss-of existing employment or employment-related bene-
fits."23 4 In effect, these issues would be major disputes or mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 23 5
The court then used the fourth amendment to provide the ration-
ale for its holding. It reasoned that the same analysis applies in both
fourth amendment and contract right cases, since the critical con-
cern of each is employee privacy.23 6 Since the fourth amendment dis-
tinguishes between suspicion and suspicionless testing, the court con-
cluded that the union's acquiescence to testing based on suspicion is
not an adequate basis for generalized testing.237
On almost identical facts, the Eighth Circuit reached a different
result. In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Bur-
lington Northern Railroad,8 the court held that Burlington's imple-
mentation of the same testing policy to another group of employees
was a minor dispute under the RLA.s3 9 Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
this court found that the rule prohibiting possession and use of alco-
hol or drugs had become an implied term of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement.240 The court also considered that historically,
the company tested only when there was specific evidence of impair-
ment, to which the union had always acquiesced.24'
The court, after reviewing the new testing provisions, concluded
that the change in working conditions was minor because the rail-
232. Burlington 1I, 620 F. Supp. at 175. The court of appeals discussed what stan-
dard should be used to distinguish between "major" and "minor" disputes. Such phrases
as "reasonably susceptible," "arguably comprehended," and "not obviously insubstan-
tial," are commonly used. For the most part, the analysis is the same as that used to
determine whether a dispute "arose under" the contract in a grievance arbitration setting
under the NLRA. See Burlington, 838 F.2d at 1090-92.
233. Burlington, 838 F.2d at 1093.
234. Id. at 1090.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1092-93.
237. Id. at 1093.
238. 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
239. Id. at 1023.
240. Id. at 1022.
241. Id. at 1022-23.
road was still only testing employees "for cause. ' 242 The court
viewed the occurrence of an accident or violation of a safety rule as
a triggering event upon which the employer could base its decision to
test. It noted that general testing would only occur when the persons
responsible for an accident or violation remained unidentified. 24 3
Because these private sector cases arguably involve the parties'
rights under a collective bargaining agreement, the holdings provide
limited answers about private sector testing. However, the Court is
apparently of the view that if the employer historically performed
some kind of medical testing, the addition of drug testing would not
result in a bargainable issue.2 44 It is open for debate what the par-
ties' obligations are if no medical testing was done in the past and
the employer has no drug or alcohol policy.
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will approve the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach. First, the fourth amendment analysis is inapplicable
to the private sector. Second, one cannot equate implied collective
bargaining rights to protections afforded by the fourth amendment.
The existence of government regulation of railroads, and statutes
governing labor relations in this field does not change the private
character of the dispute. As a result, the sources of rights and obli-
gations will derive from the parties' collective bargaining agreement
and controlling statutory provisions, not the fourth amendment.
As noted earlier, the NLRB ruled that employee drug and alcohol
testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The NLRB cited the
Ninth Circuit's Burlington decision as supporting this proposition.24"
242. Id. at 1023.
243. Id.
244. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
2477, 2479 (1989). The Court notes that it agrees with courts that view the addition of
drug testing to physical examinations as minor disputes.
245. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26, slip op. at 12 n.21. Paraphrasing the
Ninth Circuit decision in Burlington, the NLRB noted:
The Court determined that the RLA required parties to bargain over any pro-
posal whose primary impact is the loss, or potential loss, of existing employ-
ment or employment related benefits. The Court found that since the jobs of
employees were jeopardized by the results of the employer's new drug [and]
alcohol testing requirement, that requirement was therefore not simply a mat-
ter of management prerogative, outside the scope of the employer's bargaining
obligation, but was instead a mandatory subject of bargaining under the RLA,
one which could not be implemented unilaterally.
Id. at 12 n.21 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the Court's caution in Chicago & N.W.R. Co., see supra note 213,
that one must be careful in drawing parallels between the NLRA and RLA, it recently
relied primarily on the similarity between the two in rendering a major decision in the
labor field. In Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988), the Court
limited the purposes for which unions could spend dues and fees collected from nonmem-
bers if they objected on constitutional and statutory grounds. Relying on the legislative
similarity between section 2 Eleventh of the RLA and section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, the
Court concluded that the interpretation it previously gave to section 2 Eleventh in Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), was controlling. Street essentially held that un-
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If the Supreme Court decides that the employer in Burlington was
simply exercising a right under the collective bargaining agreement,
the question of whether an employer must bargain over a "new"
testing policy will remain open. A finding that the employer is exer-
cising a right under the contract is consistent with NLRB pro-
nouncements. Under the NLRA, an employer would not have to bar-
gain over a drug and alcohol policy if it was determined that the
employer had a contractual right to implement the policy.
The Court's deference to the NLRB's judgment on this issue
might be a sound approach. However, it is questionable whether the
Court can conclude that private sector employees have similar pri-
vacy protections as those afforded by the fourth amendment, absent
some contractual or statutory provision providing for such protection.
The Court's tendency has been to give more testing flexibility to em-
ployers in certain industries, particularly where safety and trustwor-
thiness concerns are paramount. This flexibility is now pivoted
against the NLRB and Ninth Circuit rulings. Hopefully, future Su-
preme Court rulings will draw some clear lines in this somewhat
murky area.
B. Discipline or Rehabilitation
Employers are increasingly implementing new drug testing pro-
grams or revising old policies in the face of challenges to their valid-
ity. These policies generally provide for some form of discipline, dis-
charge, or rehabilitation for violations. In Skinner, an employee who
refused to test was withdrawn from covered service for nine
months.24 Under the Customs Service program, employees are sub-
ject to dismissal if they test positive and cannot offer a satisfactory
explanation.247
Whether an employer's policy provides for discipline, discharge,
rehabilitation, or some combination thereof, will depend largely on
the employer's philosophy of labor relations. Some policies provide
for discharge on the first offense, while others provide for denial of
ions could not constitutionally spend objecting nonmembers' fees for political causes. The
Court's approach in Beck demonstrates that the similarities in the bargaining obligations
of the two Acts can provide a basis for the conclusion that a unilaterally implemented
"new" policy is a "major" dispute with equivalent bargaining obligations as mandatory
subjects under the NLRA.
246. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1409
(1989).
247. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1389
(1989).
an employment opportunity, discipline, or rehabilitation. It can be
argued that discharging an employee for violating a drug. policy
amounts to ignoring the problem and transferring it to another seg-
ment of society. Additionally, contentions are made that rehabilita-
tion provides more economic advantages than discharge, and pro-
motes stable labor relations.
It is arguable whether it is an employer's responsibility to address
an employee's drug or alcohol problem. Spending hard earned dol-
lars on rehabilitation services as opposed to improving the condition
of the business or its owners might be difficult to justify in an en-
trepreneurial economy. Studies that suggest high recidivism rates for
substance abusers might also give management little encouragement.
Nonetheless, in certain occupations, providing rehabilitation services
can be justified on pure economic grounds. For jobs that require
years of training and substantial financial outlay by the employer, it
might be less expensive to pay for rehabilitation benefits than to hire
and train new employees. However, if the job is dangerous or safety-
sensitive, an employer must judge whether having a treated abuser
on the job poses a greater economic risk because of possible future
malfeasance resulting in lawsuits. One can discuss at length the eco-
nomic pros and cons of rehabilitation versus discharge. Fortunately,
many employers have voluntarily assumed the responsibility of as-
sisting employees with drug and alcohol problems.
Employers offering rehabilitation have generally done so through
Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs).24 8 EAPs are designed to as-
sist employees experiencing alcohol, drug, emotional, or other per-
sonal problems which interfere with job performance. Currently,
some employers promote these programs as part of their attempt to
resolve the drug abuse problem. The nature and composition of an
EAP varies for different employers, but ideally, the principles upon
which the EAP is based should reflect the unique circumstances of
the employer . 49 At present, it is estimated that 10,000 employers
have EAP's in operation, and that number continues to grow.2 0
248. See GUIDELINES, supra note 70; NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR WORKPLACE DRUG ABUSE PRO-
GRAMS 9-11 (1987) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLANNING]; Masi, The Role of Employee
Assistance Programs, in NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WORKPLACE DRUG ABUSE POLICY 51 (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WHAT WORKS: WORKPLACES WITHOUT DRUGS 17-18 (1989) [hereinafter WHAT
WORKS].
249. See STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 248, at 35-41 (model programs for
Wells Fargo Bank; Union Carbide; Lockheed Corp.; Toyota; City and County of Ven-
tura, California; and Carpenter Technology Corp.); see also Thorne, Development of an
Employee Assistance Program at Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, in
NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKPLACE
DRUG ABUSE POLICY 89 (1989).
250. See STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 248, at 14-15; WHAT WORKS, supra
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If top management is committed to rehabilitation, the EAP can be
an attractive resolution mechanism. The availability of the program
and its services can be effectively communicated to employees. Pro-
fessional assistance is usually provided in the form of medical and
social counseling of personnel. Ensuring confidentiality and disclos-
ing information only on a need-to-know basis is also critical. Demon-
strated overall commitment and guaranteed confidentiality by man-
agement tends to greatly increase employee acceptability of the
EAP. 251
As a general rule, the employees and their supervisors are primar-
ily responsible for referral. If employees perceive the EAP as a help-
ful rather than a punitive tool, it is highly likely that the employees
will voluntarily disclose their problem. For the supervisor, analysis of
job related factors such as tardiness, absenteeism, recurring acci-
dents, quantity and quality of work, long lunch breaks, and theft are
helpful for early detection. In addition to performance related fac-
tors, the supervisor can assess employees' physical and emotional
conditions. A committed and trained supervisor is usually very famil-
iar with employees' normal physical and emotional makeups. That
supervisor can also be trained to recognize the symptoms of drug and
alcohol abuse. In this way, apparent inconsistencies in behavior are
detected and addressed at an early stage.2 52
Once a problem is detected by the supervisor or disclosed by the
employee through self-referral, the decision to accept treatment, if
that option is available, usually lies solely with the employee. The
drug policy should state the employer's position, in the event the em-
ployee chooses to undertake or refuse treatment after a problem is
identified. Some policies provide for discharge if the employee ref-
uses to undertake treatment. Undertaking and successfully complet-
ing treatment is especially important when an employee's job respon-
sibilities directly affect the safety and security of other employees, or
the public at large. Employers usually have great testing flexibility
when safety and security considerations are at work, and the Court's
recent decisions have buttressed the employers' protection. 53
note 248, at 17.
251. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORK-
PLACE 14-15 (1986).
252. STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 248, at 21-22.
253. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477
(1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
C. The Criticalness of Privacy
The need to minimize infringement on an employee's dignity can-
not be overemphasized. Serious consideration must be given to pri-
vacy rights, not only from the legal requirement standpoint, but from
a humanistic standpoint as well. 2 4 Moreover, testing has created a
new point of contact between employer and employee, and with it
the great propensity to adversely affect the employment relationship.
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court focused on this over-
whelming issue that goes to the heart of human dignity. 2 s In Skin-
ner, the Court trivialized the impact of requiring an employee to give
blood for testing. The Court stayed aloof and gave a "customary
health reasons" analysis of blood tests. Such tests were considered
safe, commonplace, and without risk, trauma, or pain.256
This, however, is not workplace reality. Labor relations personnel
with hands-on testing experience can attest to the trauma and de-
struction, albeit intangible, engendered by drawing an employee's
blood to test for drugs or alcohol. The aftermath is particularly dev-
astating in instances when the employee is "clean."
The Court was more appreciative of the impact on these interests
with urine collection. Here, the invasion hits closer to home. Cer-
tainly the Justices understand human anatomy, and the privacy of
human organs. Passing urine is unquestionably safe, commonplace,
and without risk, trauma, or pain. Yet, the Court felt that "the pro-
cedures, sample collection which require employees to perform an
excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise con-
cerns not implicated by blood or breath tests. '251 7 To further empha-
size this point, the Court quoted the Von Raab court of appeals'
characterization of this issue:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they tall about
it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation;
indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as
social custom. 58
254. Two new nonintrusive approaches to drug and alcohol testing are currently
being investigated. A new "sweat-patch" test measures alcohol consumption, and a hair
analysis test measures drug use. If these testing methods prove to be medically sound for
workplace testing, they will, to some extent, reduce employees' privacy concerns, See
Montagne, Pugh & Fink, supra note 70, at 1299.
255. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413, 1418; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-94; see also
id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985);
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757(1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
257. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
258. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1413 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part and vacated in part, 109 5.
Ct. 1384 (1989)).
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Therefore, steps taken by employers to reduce the offensiveness of
testing become all-important. In Skinner, the employer reduced the
intrusiveness by having outside personnel handle the testing. In addi-
tion, a medical environment was provided, and there was no visual
observation required for urine specimens.259 These procedures go a
long way to secure an employee's dignity. By having an independent
entity handle testing, the employee is not faced with the stigma of
being escorted by a supervisor or other employer personnel to a com-
pany office or medical department, nor faced with the risk that a
fellow employee observes the events. This limits the testing contact
between employer and employee, and the end result is greater confi-
dentiality in the testing process.
The indignity worked by the taking of blood or urine in the em-
ployment context cannot be equated or analogized to activities per-
formed for customary health related reasons. Employers and employ-
ees recognize the unique position they hold and the distinct
relationship which exists between management and labor. This rela-
tionship historically had socially built-in understandings of what is
shielded or private and therefore outside the employer's domain, and
what is open to inquiry and investigation, and therefore discoverable
within the relationship. Therefore, employers should exercise great
caution before treading on privacy rights.
III. SUMMARY
Because the issue of employment drug testing is volatile, employ-
ers should consult experts when developing their policies. Ideally,
consideration should be given to the rights of the employee and the
general public as the employer strives to achieve a drug-free work
environment. An employer's policy should be driven by the em-
ployer's conviction that drug and alcohol abuse adversely impacts
health, safety, productivity, security, and public trust or confidence
in the employer. It should be detailed and specific as to what con-
duct is proscribed and what discipline, if any, will follow. The em-
ployer should remain unequivocal in its expectations under the pol-
icy, and should ensure that all employees are aware of the policy and
the consequences that flow from its violation. Once implemented, the
employer must ensure that the policy is consistently administered.
Educating management is critical in the administration of an ef-
fective drug policy. Some employers have training programs
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designed to assist supervisory personnel in making intelligent deci-
sions about suspected drug or alcohol use. Some programs are com-
prised of slides, handouts, and lectures covering a wide range of test-
ing issues. For example, slides of the most commonly ingested drugs
can be shown to supervisory personnel and discussed. Employers can
also discuss the symptoms normally associated with drug use.
Management staff must be cautioned that many of the symptoms
associated with illegal drug use are also common to normal ailments;
hence, they should take care when investigating for possible drug
and alcohol abuse. In addition, use of some drugs does not result in
overt signs of impairment. Management personnel should also be ed-
ucated about the legal and contractual rights of employees in order
to avoid a trampling of these rights or the concomitant lawsuits or
challenges. Special regard should be given to employees' privacy
interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions in this country, and
drug testing appears to be here to stay. Clearly, the problem is
larger than the relationship between any one individual employer
and an employee. Drug testing has opened the door for countless
societal developments. The country's workforce, employers, employ-
ees, and employees' representatives are vigorously advocating their
positions in various tribunals.
At a minimum, the latest court decisions mean that employers
now have greater court-sanctioned freedom to explore employees'
physical conditions in a way that impacts the very essence of human
privacy and dignity. Employers can collect information about drug
and alcohol use without specific evidence that a substance was in-
gested, and as a natural extension, can require specimens of bodily
fluids if there is objective data that drugs or alcohol were used. How-
ever, the cases do not mean that every employer can dispense with
the probable cause or articulable suspicion requirement, whether or
not they fall under the umbrella of the fourth amendment. In sum,
the decisions do not mean that employees' rights are whittled away
to the point that employers can test at any time, for any reason,
using any procedure, and utilize the test results as they see fit.
Numerous statutory and common law protections exist to guard
against indiscriminate testing by employers. Skinner and Von Raab
serve as general guideposts for when a "triggering event" is not re-
quired for lawful testing to occur. These cases also provide some in-
sight to when employers will need specific evidence prior to testing
for drug use. However, the cases provide no insight on the extent to
which drug testing will impact or erode the traditional relationship
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between employee and management.
Maybe as time passes, people will harden and accept testing and
related intrusions as a quid pro quo for initial or continued employ-
ment. They will then make the necessary mental or psychological
adjustments, and the relationship between employer and employee
will reach a new level of normalcy. But for now, testing appears to
drive a wedge and cause some distancing between employee and
management. The effect on productivity and morale must be
watched carefully.
In analyzing this problem, one cannot exclude societal interests.
Arguably, an employee discharged for drug abuse will not automati-
cally terminate such use on the day of discharge. In all probability,
the employee will attempt to collect unemployment compensation
benefits in order to survive until new employment is found, if the
employee desires. Depending on the basis for discharge, the individ-
ual might not qualify for benefits under the jurisdiction's unemploy-
ment compensation laws. Regardless of whether benefits are
awarded or not, society might be left with an individual with insuffi-
cient funds to support a drug habit. Conceivably, such funds will be
obtained through criminal activities which the general public must
then absorb.

